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Abstract—Today, RSA algorithm is the most widely used
public-key cryptosystem around the world. It is used for security
in everything from online shopping to cell phones. However,
the basic RSA is not semantically secure, i.e., encrypting the
same message more than once always gives the same ciphertext.
For this reason, the basic RSA is vulnerable to set of indirect
attacks, such as known plaintext, chosen plaintext, timing, common
modulus, and frequency of blocks (FOB) attacks. Moreover, RSA
is known to be much slower than the standards symmetric key
encryption and it does not used for encrypting large data. In
this paper, we design and implement a swift and secure variant
of RSA based on Rabin and Huffman coding called Augmented
RSA (A-RSA) to solve aforementioned limitations of the basic
RSA. A new additional randomization component r is added
in A-RSA. This component is encrypted by Rabin algorithm to
improve the security level of RSA against the indirect attacks
and make RSA semantically secure. Moreover, A-RSA makes
the factorization problem harder, since the attackers need to
break the factorization of large numbers for both RSA and
Rabin. Besides, employing Huffman Coding compression in A-
RSA prevents FOB attack and speeds up the execution time for
the A-RSA. Our testing results over set of file sizes of 1MB,
2MB, 3MB, to 10 MB show that A-RSA’s average execution time
is equal to 0.55 of the average execution time of the basic RSA
in encryption process and 0.01 in decryption process. Also, we
found that RSA system increases the size of ciphertext by 1%
compared to the original file size, while the average size of A-RSA
files is equal 0.46 of its original sizes.
Keywords—Public-key Cryptosystems; RSA; Rabin; Huffman
Coding; Semantically Secure; RSA Attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
RSA was developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in
1978 [1]. RSA uses two keys, private and public, where the
private-key is kept secret and the public-key is published
publicly. One key can be used for encryption and the other is
used for decryption. RSA security is based on the hardness of
factoring large prime integers. To date, it has been considered
that factoring large prime integers is a hard problem, thus RSA
is secure. Currently, RSA modulus should be 1024 bits long
or greater to be considered secure.
RSA is the most widely used cryptosystem around the
world [2], [3]. It is used in digital signatures, keys exchange
and encrypting data. Many security protocols depends on
RSA, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol which
is used in Internet-based e-commerce [4]. In addition, it is
used for protecting emails and traffic of the web, and it is
used for securing some of the wireless devices and network
resources [5]. Therefore, any leak in the RSA security will
lead to security breaches in the Internet applications that rely
on the RSA and make them vulnerable to the attacks.
In fact, RSA has some limitations and downsides. The use
of RSA for encrypting large-scale data is a challenging issue,
referable to the computational intensive characteristics of the
RSA arithmetic operations. Diffie states that “the restriction
of public-key cryptography to key management and signature
applications is almost universally accepted” [6]. Since RSA is
not practical and takes long time for encrypting and decrypting
large data [7], the RSA usage is limited for authentication
capabilities, or exchange keys between two parties, and then
use another symmetric key for encrypting the entire data. In ad-
dition, basic RSA not semantically secure [8], which make the
algorithm vulnerable to some types of indirect attacks, such as
known-plaintext-attack (NPA), chosen-plaintext attack(CPA),
timing attack (TA), frequency of blocks (FOB) and, common
modulus attack (CMA). Moreover, encrypting data using RSA
generates ciphertext greater than the original plaintext.
Different implementation and optimization methods have
been suggested to enhance the execution time of RSA al-
gorithm [5], [9], [10]. Some other approaches have been
proposed to make RSA semantically secure, such as blinding
the message during the encryption process [11].
In this paper, we suggest an enhanced variant of RSA
called Augmented RSA (A-RSA). A-RSA is designed and
implemented in away to boost three sensitive factors of RSA;
encryption and decryption execution time, space, and security.
We summarize our main contributions as follows:
1) Augment RSA cryptosystem to make it more secure
against CMA, NPA, CPA, and TA; by adding a
randomized component r to the basic RSA and en-
crypting this component by another public-key cryp-
tosytem called Rabin. This makes RSA semantically
secure against these attacks by generating different
ciphertexts for the same message. Also, this makes
RSA stronger against brute force attack, since the
attackers need to break the factorization of large
numbers for both RSA and Rabin. Consequently, the
attackers will require longer time than before.
2) Thwart the FOB attack by using Huffman coding.
Huffman coding compresses data in away to reduce
the redundancy in the message, which helps to pre-
vent this attack.
3) Enhance the execution time comparing with the basic
RSA by using Huffman coding. Also, by encrypting
part of the message, while blinding the other part of
the same message using XOR-operator (⊕), since ⊕
operator is always faster than multiplication, division
and addition. Our experimental results show that A-
RSA is faster than basic RSA by about 45% in
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encryption process and around 99% in decryption
process.
4) Reduce the sizes of large data by using Huffman
coding make it feasible to use A-RSA for encrypting
large files. A-RSA reduces the size of encrypted file by
54% from the original sizes. This reduction depends
on the number of occurrences of the symbols inside
the file. While RSA system increases the size of
ciphertext by approximately 1% compared to the
original file size.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II presents
the important definitions and concepts of encryption meth-
ods that are related to the remaining sections in this paper.
Also, we discuss the most important public-key cryptosystems.
Section III discusses some of indirect attacks against RSA
cryptosystem and their countermeasure. Section IV presents
our approach to enhance RSA called A-RSA cryptosystem.
Section V presents a security analysis of A-RSA. Section VI
compares the performance of A-RSA with basic RSA. Finally,
the conclusion is given in section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
A powerful technique for protecting data is the use of cryp-
tography. Cryptography is the science or the art for protecting
data [12]. It enables us to store or to transmit sensitive data
over insecure channels. The data is scrambled (encrypted) to be
unreadable to anyone other than intended persons. Converting
the encrypted data into its original is called decryption.
The cryptographic techniques can be classified into two
groups based on the number of used keys in encryption and
decryption processes; Symmetric (is known also as shared,
conventional, secret-key, or single-key) encryption and asym-
metric (public-key) encryption. Each of these techniques has
its own characteristics and is used in a variant way based on
the need.
A. Symmetric Key Encryption
Symmetric key encryption in which the sender and receiver
share the same secret key (K) for encryption and decryption
process. For example, when Alice wants to send Bob a
message M , she encrypts M using K to produce the ciphertext
such that C = E(M,K), where E is the encryption function,
and send C to Bob. He in role decrypts the ciphertext such as
M = D(C,K), where D is the decryption function, by using
the same K to recover the original message M .
The security of symmetric encryption process depends on
several factors. First, building strong encryption algorithm
known to everyone, where no one can break it to figure
out the secret key or to decipher the ciphertext to find the
plaintext [13]. Second, the key must be long enough to avoid
the possibility of finding the key through the brute force search.
If the key is known to the adversary in anyway, then entire
encryption process will be broken. Therefore, the key must be
kept secret between the two authorized communicated parties
(sender and receiver). However, sharing or exchanging the
same key between the two communicated parties is not a trivial
task.
The communicated parties may exchange the key physi-
cally. That is, Alice chooses the key and physically delivered
to Bob. However, if there is a fare distance between them,
exchanging keys physically is not a good solution, since how
many minutes, hours or days one needs for exchanging the
key physically. If the two parties want to change the key more
than once, one of them should travel to other to deliver the
new key. If there are more than two parties like three, four, or
more, where each one of them in different countries, it is more
difficult to do that. Thus they may look for another approach to
exchange the key. As, at the first time they exchange the key
physically, and then they use the recent key for encrypting
the newly one. But if the attacker in somehow succeeds in
gaining access to one key, then all of the subsequent keys are
compromised, and the ciphertext will be disclosed.
B. Public-Key Encryption
Public-key encryption was introduced in 1976 by Diffie and
Hellman to solve the key distribution problem [14]. Public-
key encryption, also called asymmetric encryption, where one
party has a secret key called private-key and the other party
has a public-key. The private-key must be kept secret, while
the public is published, so no need for the sender and re-
ceiver to share secret information, all communications involve
only public-keys, and no private-keys are ever transmitted or
shared. When Alice wants to send Bob a message M , she
uses the Bob’s public-key KUB for encrypting M such that
C = E(M,KUB), while Bob uses his private-key KRB for
decrypting the ciphertext C such that M = D(C,KRB) to
recover the original message M . Therefore, there is no secret
key exchanged between Alice and Bob.
Currently, there are many public-key algorithms, such as
Diffie-Hellman [15], RSA [1], Rabin [16], ElGamal [17],
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [18], [19], and others.
Diffie-Hellman algorithm is used for exchanging a secret
key between two parties securely, then they use the exchanged
key to encrypt the subsequent messages using symmetric key
encryption algorithm [20]. The security of Diffie-Hellman de-
pends on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms [14].
However, the algorithm itself suffers from the man-in-the-
middle attack, since it does not authenticate the communi-
cating parties [21]. ElGamal public-key system also depends
on discrete logarithms of a large prime modulus [17]. It is
closely related to the Diffie-Hellman technique. ElGamal is
not deterministic algorithm [22], encrypting the same plaintext
gives a different ciphertext, but unfortunately the algorithm has
a disadvantage related to the message size, such as the size of
the ciphertext is twice the size of the original message [17].
RSA is most widely accepted as trusted public-key cryp-
tosystem, its security depends on the idea of the hardness
of factoring large integers [23], [24]. However, the main
disadvantage of current RSA encryption schemes is the com-
putational overhead. Rabin encryption algorithm is a public-
key algorithm, whose security similar to the RSA, based on
the hardness of integer factorization. In [16], Michael Rabin
proved that Rabin is more secure than RSA, since Rabin is
hard as hard of integer factorization, which is not true for the
RSA.
ECC is a public-key that provides equal protection to the
RSA by using smaller key size [25]. Since the algorithm is
new, the confidence level of using it is not yet as high as that
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in RSA [13]. The critical disadvantages of ECC is significant
increase in the size of the encrypted message comparing to the
RSA encryption [26].
In this paper, we focus on RSA and Rabin algorithms since
they are similar in some process like encryption. Also, the two
algorithms depends on the integer factorization. But this is a
suggested approach, Rabin can be replaced by another public-
key cryptosystem like ECC.
For using RSA cryptosystem, the sender and the receiver
need to have their own key pairs. Bob generates the RSA
key pair (KUB ,KRB). He publishes his public-key while
keeping the private-key secret. If Alice wishes to use RSA
for encrypting a message M and send it to Bob, she uses
the Bob’s public-key (KUB) for encrypting M . Once Bob
receives the encrypted message C, he uses his private-key for
decrypting C and retrieving M . Algorithm 1 summarizes the
RSA cryptosystem steps.
Algorithm 1 : Basic RSA Cryptosystem
Step 1: RSA Generating public/private key pair at the
receiver side
1: Choose two distinct large prime integers p and q.
2: Compute N = pq.
3: Compute Euler’s totient function φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
4: Choose an integer e (public exponent), such that
1<e<φ(N) and gcd(e,φ(N))=1.
5: Find an integer d (private exponent), such as ed = 1 mod
φ(N).
6: Publish the public-key (N ,e) and keep d, p, q, and φ(N)
secret.
Step 2: RSA encryption process at sender side
1: Encrypt M by computing C = Me mod N , where
0<M<N − 1.
Step 3: RSA description process receiver side
1: Decrypt C to get the original message M = Cd mod N .
Rabin algorithm has been developed by Michael Rabin
in 1979. The security of a Rabin algorithm is based on
the difficulty of factoring large integers. Rabin algorithm is
depicted in Algorithm 2. As Srivastava and Mathur state
in [27], the main disadvantage of Rabin algorithm is the extra
complexity required in decryption process for identifying the
corresponding plaintext M from the four possible roots. That
is, there are four possible output roots Mi where i = 1, 2, 3, 4
generated from the decryption process. Thus, we need extra
time to know which Mi represents the original message M .To
make it is easier to distinguish the correct message from
the four roots, we pad the message before encryption. After
decryption, only one from the four possible messages will
contain that special padding characters.
After introducing RSA and Rabin cryptosystems, in the
following section we present the indrect attacks against the
basic RSA.
III. RSA INDIRECT ATTACKS
RSA encryption algorithm is secure as no one gets other
than the public-key, otherwise the algorithm is not secure.
For example, (d, p, q, φ(N)) are the important four RSA
Algorithm 2 : Rabin Cryptosystem
Step 1: Generating public/private key pair at the receiver
side
1: Choose two distinct large prime integers p and q in the
form 4k + 3.
2: Compute n = pq.
3: Publish the public-key (n) and Keep the private-key (p, q)
secret.
Step 2: Rabin encryption process at sender side
1: Encrypt M by computing C = M2 mod n, where
0<M<n− 1.
Step 3: Rabin description process receiver side
1: Decrypt C by using the private-key (p, q) as follows:
• Compute R = C(p+1)/4 mod p and S =
C(q+1)/4 mod q
• Find a, b such that ap+ bq = 1
• Find M1 = (apS+ bqR) mod n, M2 = (n−M1),
M3 = (apS − bqR) mod n and M4 = (n−M3)
• Choose which Mi is the correct root (plaintext M ),
where i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
parameters that form the RSA trap-door. If any one of these
parameters are known, then the RSA will be compromised
completely [11].
There are different possible approaches to attacking RSA
cryptosystem. We can put them into two main categories; direct
and indirect attacks. Direct attack includes mathematical and
brute-force attacks. The mathematical attacks represented by
the effort to factorize the product of two large prime integers,
which is widely believed to be a hard problem. In the brute-
force attack the attacker tries all possible combinations to find
to the private-key. The defense against the brute-force attack
is to use a large key space. In indirect attacks the attackers try
to exploit the weaknesses of the algorithm implementation or
depending on other information available to them to generate
their attacks.
The basic RSA is a deterministic algorithm, which means
the message has always the same encryption for same key. This
property enable attackers to successfully launch many kinds
of indirect attacks, such as common modulus attack, known-
plaintext attack, chosen-plaintext attack and timing attack.
This paper focus on the following indirect attacks, which are
important for the remaining of this paper. The paper does not
cover the chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA) and the Hardware
fault-based attack [28].
A. Common Modulus Attack (CMA)
Suppose a message M is encrypted twice by using RSA
cryptosystem using the same modulus N = pq with different
public-keys (e1, N ) and (e2, N ) such that gcd(e1, e2) = 1. If
the attacker know C1 =Me1 mod N and C2 =Me2 mod N ,
then she can recover the original message M [11], [29]. For
knowing e1 and e2, find two integers a and b such that a ×
e1+b×e2 = 1 using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm. Then
compute C1aC2b ≡ Ma×e1M b×e2 ≡ Ma×e1+b×e2 ≡ M .
This implies that any party can obtain the public-keys and the
corresponding ciphertexts could be capable to intercept all the
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messages which would be encrypted twice to different users.
One of the suggestions to protect RSA from common modules
attack is to never use common modules in RSA [11].
B. Known-Plaintext Attack (KPA)
In this type of attack, the adversary may be able to capture
a set of plaintexts with its corresponding ciphertexts, to build
the set S = {(P1, C1), (P2, C2), ...,
(Pi, Ci)}, where Pi ∈ plaintext and Ci ∈ ciphertext [13], [30].
The attacker can used any later captured messages encrypted
with the same key to find the plaintext Pi if the corresponding
Ci is in set S. Because the basic RSA is a deterministic
algorithm, encrypting the same message more than once with
the same key gives the same ciphertext. Based on the pre-built
set S, the adversary can use any later captured data to find
the plaintext Pi+1 if the corresponding Ci+1 is in the set S.
Accordingly, the adversary who obtain partial of plaintext, can
guess the other parts.
C. Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA)
This attack is similar to known-plaintext attack but the
adversary has more power, The adversary chooses an arbitrary
message M and in somehow she is able to insert the chooses
M into the system to get the corresponding ciphertext [13].
Thus, the attacker can build a set of plaintexts-ciphertexts, such
as S = {(P1, C1), (P2, C2), ..., (Pi, Ci)}, where Pi ∈ plaintext
and Ci ∈ ciphertext.
D. Timing Attack (TA)
In this type of attack, the attacker obtains the information
based on the implementation of the algorithm itself, without
exploiting any weakness in the mathematical approach that the
algorithm applied [31]. The attacker exploits the variance of
the time in cryptographic operations. That is, the computations
performed by a cryptographic algorithm takes a different
amount of time based on the input and the value of the secret
parameter in addition to the performance of the system that
involved in this computation. If RSA private-key operations
can be timed accurately, statistical analysis can be used to
obtain the secret key involved in the computations. Kocher
demonstrates this kind of attack in [32] by computing how
long a computer takes to decrypt a message. Boneh [8] show
that the attacker can recover the private-key d one bit at a
time until the secret exponent d is known. One suggestion to
prevent timing attack is to use random component as shown
in Algorithm 3 [11].
Algorithm 3 : Anti-Timing attack
1: Generate a secret random number r ∈ Z∗N .
2: Compute C ′ = C × re mod N .
3: Compute M ′ = C ′d mod N .
4: Compute M =M ′ × r−1 mod N .
E. Frequency of Blocks Attack (FOB)
RSA is a kind of block cipher cryptosystem even it is not
intended to be used as a block cipher. RSA is typically used
for encrypting small pieces of data, such as symmetric key that
is then used for encrypting the entire message. Nevertheless,
RSA cryptosystem works on block cipher manner where the
message is divided into a number of blocks based on the size
of the block. The block size can be chosen between 1 to N−1
for some N .
The basic RSA suffers from Frequency of Blocks (FOB)
attack. When one of the blocks repeated within the same
message, then the block has the ciphertext similar to that in
the first block. The main cause of this problem return to the
fact that basic RSA is deterministic algorithm. The following
example shows how basic RSA is not secure against this attack.
Suppose the block size is 127 bytes and the message size is
635 bytes, so the number of blocks are 5. If two blocks are
repeated within the same message, each of them will have
the same ciphertext. If the attacker in somehow know that the
message contains repeated block, may exploit this weakness
to find the plaintext. To the best of our knowledge, no one
points to this type of attack in RSA. The reason may refer to
the fact that RSA is usually used for key exchange and digital
signature, instead of encrypting the majority of data.1.
IV. AUGMENTED RSA
A-RSA cryptosystem has two new additions besides the
basic RSA and Rabin algorithms; Huffman coding and Ran-
dom component r. The basic RSA and Rabin are explained
in Section II. Here, we discuss the other two modifications in
more details.
A. Huffman Coding in A-RSA Cryptosystem
According to the Simmons [34], cryptographers consider
data compression algorithms as a ciphering scheme. Also,
Shannon [35] suggested that reducing the redundancy in data
before encryption, protect it against statistical analysis. There-
fore, we use Huffman coding to achieve Simmons and Shannon
suggestions.
Huffman coding is a common method for data compres-
sion [36]. It is an algorithm that uses for lossless data com-
pression, where the original data can be recovered exactly from
the compressed data. The algorithm is used to compress data
(symbols or alphabet) to generate variable-length codes instead
of fixed-length codes for each symbol. Given a set of symbols
in a file, the algorithm performs some statistical analysis to
construct a table that contains the frequencies of occurrence
for each symbol. The algorithm uses the constructed frequency
table to build Huffman tree, which is used to assign each
symbol with its appropriate code length based on the symbol
occurrence. The result of applying Huffman coding on the data
file is two files; binary file (B) and header file (H). The binary
file depends on the header file for retrieving the original data.
Thus, if the header file is lost, then the true data cannot be
retrieved. The header file contains all symbols of the original
data file or its corresponding ASCII codes. The header file
contains unique symbols assigned with its occurrence, where
no symbol is repeated twice. The binary file contains the code
for each symbol.
1FOB attack exists in symmetric key encryption, and many techniques are
used to solve it, such as using cipher block chaining (CBC) mode, cipher
feedback (CFB) mode and counter mode (CTR) [33].
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A-RSA system depends on Huffman coding for enhancing
security and speeds up the encryption and decryption pro-
cesses. The Huffman coding output characters have the same
level of distribution and this in turn solve the FOB attack. To
enhance the execution time, A-RSA encrypts the header file and
blinds the binary file instead of encrypting the entire message.
Blinding the binary file by r parameter makes the encrypted
message semantically secure.
Consider the following example to explain the usage
of Huffman coding in A-RSA. Let the message before
compression is (Hello, this message is created
by Alice.). Before compression, the number of bits in this
message = 41×8 = 328 bits, since each symbol represents in
8 bits (fixed length). Deploying Huffman coding produces the
corresponding header and binary files for the above message.
Header File:
sp101e110s000c0101l1000i1110t0110d00111A00
110a11110o00100m10010H01000,01110r00101y01
001A`01111g111110b100111.111111h100110
Binary File:
010001101000100000100011101010110100110111
000010110010110000000111101111101101011110
000101010100101110111100110110001111011001
110100110100110100011100101110111111011110
The number of bits for the compressed message in the
binary file is equal to 167 bits. Each symbol represents in the
binary file is assigned to different length of binary code based
on its frequency of occurrence. For example, we represent the
characters e by 110 and a with 11110. The character e has
shorter binary code comparing with a, since e is repeated in
the message 6 times, while a is repeated 2 times.
For un-compressing the message, first read the header file
and use its information to build the Huffman tree. Second, read
the binary file bit by bit, then begin from the root of the tree.
When finding the 0 bit, move to the left on the tree; when
finding the 1 bit, move to the right on the tree until finding a
leaf node (we have found the symbol). Then repeat the process
for all remaining bits until all message characters are retrieved.
B. Random Component (r) in A-RSA
We use a randomized component r in A-RSA cryptosystem
to make the encryption process semantically secure. Each
time the message is encrypted, different ciphertext is obtained.
Therefore, it is hard for an attacker to learn from the ciphertext
about the original message, because ciphertexts for the same
message look different. We use the letter r to denote the
randomized component, where r is a random number generated
by using a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number
generator and used once for each message (nonce). We use r
for blinding the ciphertext of the header file and blinding the
binary file. In the case of r less than the ciphertext, we repeat
r many times to be as the length of the ciphertext and if the r
greater than the ciphertext, we remove the number of bits from
r to be as the same length of the ciphertext. And applying the
same idea when blinding the binary file.
Algorithm 4 summarizes the A-RSA cryptosystem encryp-
tion and decryption processes. Huffman code is used for
compressing the message and produces the header and binary
files. The header file is encrypted using RSA C = He mod N .
To make encryption process semantically secure, we choose a
random component r and calculate a new ciphertext C ′ =
C ⊕ r. We called the C ′ Mixture. To make the binary file B
semantically secure, B is blinded with r, such as B′ = B⊕ r.
The random component r should be protected, so we use Rabin
encryption algorithm for encrypting r.
Algorithm 4 : A-RSA Cryptosystem
Step 1: Keys generation at receiver side
1: Compute RSA public/private keys as explained in Algo-
rithm 1
2: Compute Rabin public/private keys as explained in Algo-
rithm 2
Step 2: Encryption preparation at sender side
1: Generate a random component r for each message
2: Compress message using Huffman code. The outputs from
Huffman code are:
• Binary file (B)
• Header file (H)
Step 3: Encryption at sender side
1: Encrypt H by RSA and the result is C = He mod N ,
where 0<H<N − 1
2: Blind C by r to generate the mixture C ′ = C ⊕ r
3: Blind binary file B by r to generate B′ = B ⊕ r
4: Encrypt r by Rabin and the r′ = r2 mod N
Step 3: Description at receiver side
1: Decrypt r using Rabin cryptosystem as explained in Al-
gorithm 2
2: Compute C from the mixture C = C ′ ⊕ r
3: Compute B = B′ ⊕ r
4: Decrypt C using RSA decryption to generate H =
Cd mod N
Step 4: Uncompressed the message at receiver side
1: Pass the H and B to Huffman code to reconstruct the
message
V. A-RSA SECURITY ANALYSIS
A-RSA cryptosystem is semantically secure and mitigates
the indirect attacks. Choosing a message M and two different
random components r1 and r2, leads to different ciphers for the
same message as shown in Algorithm 4. The attacker cannot
know if these ciphertext related to one message or to the
different messages. While it was not the case for the basic RSA
where encrypting the message with same key always gives the
same ciphertext. The semantically secure property of A-RSA
solves the attacks presented in section III.
1) A-RSA cryptosystem is secure against the common
modulus attack. This attack is used to recover the
message that was encrypted using two RSA keys
by using the same modules N with different public
exponents. In the case of A-RSA cryptosystem, the
attacker cannot find the message since C ′1 = C1 ⊕ r
and C ′2 = C2 ⊕ r. Thus, applying the formula
C ′1
a
C ′2
b ≡M ′ where M ′ 6=M .
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2) A-RSA cryptosystem is protected from known-
plaintext attack. A-RSA cryptosystem is not de-
terministic, since it depends on random compo-
nent that makes the ciphertext always different,
even if the same message is encrypted more than
one time with the same key. The attacker can-
not guess the right plaintext-ciphertext pair. Given
{(P1, C ′1), (P2, C ′2), ..., (Pi, C ′i)}. Where C ′i = Ci ⊕
ri for r1 6= r2 6= r3, ..., 6= ri. Since each ciphertext is
blinded with different r, the attacker cannot guess
further new plaintext based on a pre-built set of
plaintext-ciphertext.
3) A-RSA cryptosystem is protected from chosen-
plaintext attack because it depends on r, where each
message has different r. That is encrypting the same
message more than once produces different ciphers,
so no one can build a unique set like S that contains
plaintext with corresponding ciphertext.
4) A-RSA cryptosystem is secure against timing attack.
In A-RSA cryptosystem the attacker still needs the
random component r to decrypt the ciphertext, find-
ing d does not allow the attacker to decrypt the
message without r since r is XORed with the ci-
phertext. Thus, the decryption time depends on the
random component and this add some confusion to
the attacker.
5) A-RSA cryptosystem is protected from the frequency
of blocks (FOB) attack, since it compresses the
message before the encryption. Consequently, the
characters in the compressed message has a uniform
distribution and thus no repeated blocks are produced
for the same message after applying A-RSA cryp-
tosystem.
6) The brute-force and the factorization attacks against
A-RSA are much harder than in basic RSA, since A-
RSA relies on the basic RSA and Rabin. Therefore,
the brute-force attack have to be carried out against
two keys and the factorization have to be done against
two public cryptosystems.
VI. A-RSA PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
For testing the performance of A-RSA cryptosystem com-
paring with the basic RSA, we carried out a set of experiments
on different PCs. PC1 is Dell machine runs Windows 7 Profes-
sional SP1 with 32-bit on Intel(R) Core(TM), i7-2640M, CPU
2.80 GHz, and 8.00 GB RAM. PC2 is Lenovo machine runs
Windows 7 Ultimate SP1 with 32-bit on Intel(R) Core(TM),
i5-2520M, CPU 2.50 GHz, and 4.00 GB RAM. PC3 is Dell
machine runs Windows 7 Ultimate SP1 with 64-bit on Intel(R)
Core(TM), i7-2630QM, CPU 2.00 GHz, and 8.00 GB RAM.
We select N = 1024 bits and a standard public exponent
e = 65537 for RSA. We use ten files with different sizes from
1MB to 10MB. Each file is encrypted three times with both
RSA and A-RSA cryptosystems and we compute the average
of these reading times.
Figure 1 shows the behavior of RSA and A-RSA in en-
cryption process for different file sizes. Actually, the figure
represents the average execution time. Each point on the chart
represents the average of the execution time for three PC’s for
each cryptosystem. For instance, the point (1, 2.88) represents
Fig. 1. Encryption Time for RSA and A-RSA Cryptosystems.
the average of (2.5,3.02,3.11) for RSA, and the point (1,2.91)
represents the average of (2.82,2.65,3.26) for A-RSA.
Figure 1 shows that the encryption time directly propor-
tional to the file size for both cryptosystems, but A-RSA
is significantly faster than basic RSA. This speedup in the
encryption time refers to the fact that A-RSA does not encrypt
the entire message. It encrypts the header file and blinds
the binary file, which is generated from compression phase.
However, A-RSA is slower than basic RSA in encryption
process for 1MB file. A-RSA encrypts 1MB file within 2.91s
while it takes 2.88s using the basic RSA. The reason behind
this fact is that A-RSA encryption process passes through
four phases: statistical analysis, compression, encryption and
blinding of the message. Since the 1MB is relatively small
size, the analysis, compression, and blinding may take more
time than the encryption itself.
The behavior of RSA and A-RSA in decryption process is
depicted in Figure 2. A-RSA is faster than the basic RSA in
decryption process because RSA needs to decrypt the entire
message, but A-RSA just needs to decrypt the header file which
is much smaller than the entire message.
Comparing Figure 2 with Figure 1, one can see that
the speedup ratio between the A-RSA and the basic RSA in
decryption process is much better than in the encryption. Also,
there is a big difference in the execution time of encryption and
decryption and this returns to the two reasons. First, private
exponent d is larger than public exponent e. Second, when
encrypting the file using RSA, the encrypted file (ciphertext)
is greater than original file. In the basic RSA, the encryption is
faster than decryption or may equally, but this is not the case
for A-RSA system. A-RSA decryption process is faster than the
encryption. The reason for this observation is existence of four
phases in A-RSA encryption process (analysis, compression,
encryption and blinding), but there are three phases in A-RSA
decryption process that make its decryption faster (un-blinding,
decryption and un-compression). Taking the overall average of
encryption and decryption times of 10 files from the three PCs
shows that A-RSA cryptosystem is faster than basic RSA by
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Fig. 2. Decryption Time for RSA and A-RSA Cryptosystems
Fig. 3. RSA and A-RSA Ciphertext Size
45% in encryption process and 99% in decryption process.
A-RSA cryptosystem uses Huffman compression algorithm
to reduce file sizes. Thus, the files generated from A-RSA
system are smaller than the original files, which is helping for
reducing resource usage, such as data storage space. Figure 3
shows the size of ten files after the encryption by using
RSA and A-RSA cryptosystems. A-RSA cryptosystem results
in an efficient use of the space. We found that RSA system
increases the size of ciphertext by 1% compared to the original
file size, while A-RSA cryptosystem reduces the file size by
54% from the original size. However, the percentage of file
size reduction by using A-RSA cryptosystem depends on the
number of occurrences of the symbols inside the file.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
RSA is popular and most widely used cryptosystem through
the years until now, it is used in different applications and
protocols. Even though, RSA seems to be robust and secure,
attackers succeeded to exploit some properties of RSA al-
gorithm and its implementation to carry out some attacks,
such as common modulus, known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext,
and timing attacks. Moreover, RSA does not solved block
redundancy in the message. Besides, RSA is a time consuming
algorithm, its speed is very slow comparing with symmetric
key encryption algorithms like AES algorithm.
We suggested a new modifications to enhance RSA cryp-
tosystem called A-RSA. This enhanced RSA combines the
basic RSA with another cryptosystem called Rabin. A random-
ized component r is added to the RSA to make it semantically
secure and this component is encrypted by Rabin. A-RSA uses
Huffman coding algorithm to remove the redundancy in the
message based on statistical analysis to generate Header H
and Binary B files. A-RSA encrypts H and blinds B with r
instead of the encrypting the entire message.
The enhanced version of RSA is more secure, faster
encryption and decryption, and has shorter encrypted message
size comparing with the basic RSA. Thus, A-RSA cryptosystem
has the following characteristics:
1) Semantically secure compering to the basic RSA.
2) Secure against frequency of block attacks.
3) More secure against brute-force attack than the RSA.
4) Faster encryption and decryption compare with basic
RSA.
5) Produce shorter cipher size.
A-RSA cryptosystem could be the better choice for en-
crypting large data in a secure and fast manner over a public
network. Due the drastically improvement in the A-RSA en-
cryption and decryption time, it might more convenient to use
only the A-RSA for encryption and decryption without the use
of another symmetric key for encrypting the entire message.
REFERENCES
[1] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, “A method for obtaining
digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems,” Communications of
the ACM, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 120–126, 1978.
[2] Z. Wang, Z. Jia, L. Ju, and R. Chen, “Asip-based design and implemen-
tation of rsa for embedded systems,” in High Performance Computing
and Communication & 2012 IEEE 9th International Conference on
Embedded Software and Systems (HPCC-ICESS), 2012 IEEE 14th
International Conference on. IEEE, 2012, pp. 1375–1382.
[3] A. Freier, P. Karlton, and P. Kocher, “The secure sockets layer (ssl)
protocol version 3.0,” August 2011, rFC6101.
[4] T. Dierks and E. Rescorla, “The transport layer security (tls) protocol
version 1.2,” August 2008, rFC5246.
[5] D. Boneh and H. Shacham, “Fast variants of rsa,” CryptoBytes, vol. 5,
no. 1, pp. 1–9, 2002.
[6] W. Diffie, “The first ten years of public-key cryptography,” Proceedings
of the IEEE, vol. 76, no. 5, pp. 560–577, 1988.
[7] H. Orman and P. Hoffman, “Determining strengths for public keys used
for exchanging symmetric keys,” 2004, rFC3766.
[8] D. Boneh, “Twenty years of attacks on the rsa cryptosystem,” Notices
of the AMS, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 203–213, 1999.
[9] T. Takagi, “Fast rsa-type cryptosystem modulo p k q,” in Advances in
Cryptology–CRYPTO’98. Springer, 1998, pp. 318–326.
[10] R.-J. Hwang, F.-F. Su, Y.-S. Yeh, and C.-Y. Chen, “An efficient decryp-
tion method for rsa cryptosystem,” in Advanced Information Networking
and Applications, 2005. AINA 2005. 19th International Conference on,
vol. 1. IEEE, 2005, pp. 585–590.
[11] S. Y. Yan, Cryptanalytic attacks on RSA. Springer, 2007.
[12] M. Bishop, “What is computer security?” Security & Privacy, IEEE,
vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 67–69, 2003.
[13] W. Stallings, Network security essentials applications and standards,
5th. Pearson Education, 2013.
[14] W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, “New directions in cryptography,”
Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 644–
654, 1976.
[15] E. Rescorla, “Diffie-hellman key agreement method,” June 1999,
rFC2631.
www.saiconference.com 1022 | P a g e
SAI Computing Conference 2016
July 13-15, 2016 | London, UK
[16] M. O. Rabin, “Digitalized signatures and public-key functions as
intractable as factorization,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Tech. Rep., 1979.
[17] T. ElGamal, “A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based
on discrete logarithms,” in Advances in Cryptology. Springer, 1985,
pp. 10–18.
[18] N. Koblitz, “Elliptic curve cryptosystems,” Mathematics of Computa-
tion, vol. 48, no. 177, pp. 203–209, Jan. 1987, american Mathematical
Society.
[19] V. S. Miller, “Use of elliptic curves in cryptography,” in Lecture Notes
in Computer Sciences; on Advances in cryptology—CRYPTO 85, vol.
218. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 1986, pp. 417–426.
[20] E. Fujisaki and T. Okamoto, “Secure integration of asymmetric
and symmetric encryption schemes,” in Advances in Cryptology–
CRYPTO’99. Springer, 1999, pp. 537–554.
[21] L. Harn, W.-J. Hsin, and M. Mehta, “Authenticated diffie–hellman
key agreement protocol using a single cryptographic assumption,” IEE
Proceedings-Communications, vol. 152, no. 4, pp. 404–410, 2005.
[22] M. Bellare, A. Boldyreva, A. Desai, and D. Pointcheval, “Key-privacy in
public-key encryption,” in Advances in Cryptology–ASIACRYPT 2001.
Springer, 2001, pp. 566–582.
[23] R. S. Douglas, “Cryptography theory and practice,” 1995.
[24] S. Sharma, P. Sharma, and R. S. Dhakar, “Rsa algorithm using modified
subset sum cryptosystem,” in Computer and Communication Technology
(ICCCT), 2011 2nd International Conference on. IEEE, 2011, pp. 457–
461.
[25] A. S. Wander, N. Gura, H. Eberle, V. Gupta, and S. C. Shantz, “Energy
analysis of public-key cryptography for wireless sensor networks,” in
Pervasive Computing and Communications, 2005. PerCom 2005. Third
IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2005, pp. 324–328.
[26] G. HS, M. Seetha, A. K. Koundinya, and P. CA, “Comparative study and
performance analysis of encryption in rsa, ecc and goldwasser-micali
cryptosystems,” International Journal of Application or Innovation in
Engineering & Management (IJAIEM), vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 111–118,
January 2014.
[27] A. K. Srivastava and A. Mathur, “The Rabin cryptosystem & analysis
in measure of chinese reminder theorem,” International Journal of
Scientific and Research Publications, p. 493, 2013.
[28] V. B. Andrea Pellegrini and T. Austin, “Fault-based attack of rsa
authentication,” in Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference &
Exhibition (DATE). IEEE, 2010, pp. 855 – 860. [Online]. Available:
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=5456933
[29] I. K. Salah, A. Darwish, and S. Oqeili, “Mathematical attacks on rsa
cryptosystem,” Journal of Computer science, vol. 2, no. 8, p. 665, 2006.
[30] C. Cobb, Cryptography for dummies. John Wiley & Sons, 2004.
[31] W. H. Wong, “Timing attacks on RSA: revealing your secrets through
the fourth dimension,” Crossroads, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 5–5, 2005.
[32] P. C. Kocher, “Timing attacks on implementations of diffie-hellman,
rsa, dss, and other systems,” in Proceedings of the 16th Annual
International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, ser.
CRYPTO ’96. London, UK, UK: Springer-Verlag, 1996, pp. 104–113.
[Online]. Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=646761.706156
[33] M. Dworkin, “Recommendation for block cipher modes of operation.
methods and techniques,” DTIC Document, Tech. Rep., 2001.
[34] G. J. Simmons, Contemporary cryptology: the science of information
integrity. IEEE press, 1994.
[35] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems*,” Bell
system technical journal, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 656–715, 1949.
[36] D. Salomon, A concise introduction to data compression. Springer,
2007.
www.saiconference.com 1023 | P a g e
The author has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. All in-text references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate.
